摘要
数字游戏平台在二手交易权限和动态定价方面具有更大灵活性.本文构建了一种包含异质偏好和二阶段购买行为的动态定价模型,对比了禁止与允许二手交易下的平台最优策略与市场均衡.结果表明,在禁止二手交易模式下,延迟消费效用的增加促使平台从市场渗透转向利润最大化.允许二手交易时,平台可能通过高价引导用户转售,或以适中定价策略提供二手库存.平台应依据用户初始使用和二手交易潜力动态调整模式.效用较低时,允许二手交易来提高市场覆盖;初始效用较高但二手潜力较低时,禁止二手交易可保护利润;整体购买意愿较强时,2种模式均能带来回报.低初始使用价值的游戏更易获得早期参与和更高的利润;高热度游戏则呈现更明显的用户分化.
Digital game platforms have flexible resale permis-sions and dynamic pricing.A dynamic pricing model with diverse user preferences and two-stage purchase behaviors is developed.Optimal strategies and market equilibria are compared under the resale-prohibited and resale-permitted modes.The results show that resale prohibition shifts plat-forms'focus from market penetration to profit maximization due to higher utility from delayed consumption.Under re-sale permission,platforms can set high prices for user resale or offer resale inventory at moderate prices.The operational modes are adjusted dynamically based on users'initial us-age and resale valuation.When the user utility is low,re-sale expands market coverage.When the initial usage is high and the resale potential is low,margins can be pro-tected by prohibiting resale.If the overall purchase intent is strong,both modes yield substantial returns.Games with lower initial usage value achieve broader early participation and higher profit,whereas high-enthusiasm games exhibit sharper segmentation.