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制度多样性的理论内涵与治理意蕴
The Theoretical Connotation and Governance Implications of Institutional Diversity
摘要 制度多样性是社会持续有效运行的基础,但常常被忽视和破坏,也是中国公共治理实践中时常出现制度与情境不匹配、政策执行悬置、"一刀切"等治理困境的原因.埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆的制度多样性理论从制度嵌套、行动情境匹配和反馈演进三个方面勾勒出制度运行的逻辑,揭示了为何现实中的制度存在多样性,与中国公共治理的演进逻辑和基本特征具有内在契合性.然而,目前公共治理中仍存在制度执行的程序固化、制度模式的同质化以及制度调适的路径依赖等问题,其核心是忽视甚至破坏了制度多样性.在理论上理解和认识制度多样性原理,在实践中保护和利用制度多样性,对于增进中国公共治理具有重要理论意蕴和实践价值.
Abstract:
Although institutions are human artifacts,they follow an internal logic that generates,and indeed requires,diversity.Just as biodiversity sustains ecosystems,institutional diversity underpins the ef-fective functioning of social order.Drawing on Elinor Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Develop-ment(IAD)framework,this paper examines the theoretical connotations of institutional diversity and its implications for Chinese public governance,addressing two questions:Why do real-world institu-tions exhibit such pronounced diversity?And how can this theory illuminate the persistent mismatch between institutions and action situations in Chinese governance practice? The paper distills Ostrom's theory into three analytical dimensions:the vertically nested struc-ture,in which constitutional rules constrain collective-choice rules that in turn shape operational rules;the matching relationship between operational rules and action situations—micro-level arenas defined by participants,positions,and contextual variables;and the collective-choice arena through which mismatched rules are revised.These dimensions reveal that vertical nesting coexists with micro-level interaction,top-down transmission with bottom-up feedback,and formal design with spontane-ous order.Institutional diversity is a natural product of this logic,arising as rules differentiate through nested layers,as heterogeneous and nonlinear action situations demand context-specific rules,and as institutions evolve along multiple pathways,learning,imitation,reinterpretation,neglect,and non-enforcement. The paper then demonstrates that institutional diversity theory resonates deeply with Chinese gov-ernance.Traditional thought,from yindi zhiyi(adapting governance to local conditions)to the Legal-ist insight that law must evolve with the times—articulates the diversity principle in indigenous terms.Three post-reform governance features correspond closely to the theory's mechanisms.Grass-roots innovation,from Zhejiang's"at most one visit"reform to Beijing's"respond upon complaint"system,exemplifies matching operational rules to local action situations.The central-local relation-ship mirrors the vertically nested structure,where central directives are progressively translated into differentiated local implementation—reframing what is conventionally seen as policy deviation as a necessary process of adaptation.The gradualist"pilot-summarize-diffuse"reform path reflects institu-tional evolution through feedback loops that reduce the cost of systemic transformation. Yet the paper also identifies a recurrent pathology:institutional diversity is frequently neglected or undermined in practice,producing three governance predicaments.Procedural rigidification reduces dynamic governance to standardized checklists,with grassroots actors forfeiting rule-adaptation in fa-vor of mechanical compliance.Institutional homogenization leads localities to uncritically replicate"successful models"without regard for contextual fit—visible in the indiscriminate promotion of leis-ure agriculture templates and imported water-user associations.Path dependence in adaptation causes grassroots actors,even upon recognizing mismatches,to cling to existing practices rather than risk in-novation. These predicaments share a structural root:pressure from vertical accountability mechanisms.China's target-based responsibility system,while effective at ensuring execution,incentivizes grass-roots actors to prioritize indicator compliance over contextual responsiveness.Under vertical assess-ment pressure and lateral task overload,local officials gravitate toward strict adherence to superiors'directives,eschewing the adaptive innovation that institutional diversity demands. Against this diagnosis,the paper examines the Targeted Poverty Alleviation campaign as a case demonstrating that centralized governance can nonetheless preserve institutional diversity.The cam-paign's insistence on precision—identifying specific households,causes,and remedies—constitu-ted a principled rejection of one-size-fits-all governance.At the policy-design level,it supplied a diversified toolkit and mobilized multiple actors—government,market,and civil society—to match varied poverty contexts.At the implementation level,resident work teams and villager self-govern-ance ensured that operational rules were adapted to local conditions and that feedback flowed upward to correct mismatches. The paper concludes that protecting and harnessing institutional diversity requires action on three fronts.The first is cognitive:officials at all levels must recognize institutional diversity as an objective regularity rooted in the logic of institutional operation,not a defect to be eliminated through standardi-zation.The second is environmental:governance design should connect top-level frameworks with lo-cal knowledge,construct fault-tolerant accountability mechanisms that leave room for adaptive experi-mentation,and encourage multi-actor participation in rule revision.The third is theoretical:scholar-ship should advance institutional diversity research within the Chinese context,particularly as compu-tational social science opens new possibilities for studying the micro-mechanisms of institutional adap-tation at finer scales and for enabling precision governance in complex societies.
刊 名 东南学术 ISTICPKU
年,卷(期): 2026, (5)
分类号: D035
机标分类号: D61 R221.3 G641
在线出版日期: 2026年10月12日
基金项目: 23ZDA047:国家社会科学基金,