考虑碳谎报和上网电价约束下的可再生能源投资策略研究
The Impact of Carbon Quota Mechanisms on Renewable Energy Investment Strategies under Carbon Misreporting and Feed-in Tariff Cap Constraints
摘要
在碳配额机制下,发电商有动机进行碳谎报.本文基于现实的上网电价约束背景,考虑发电商的碳谎报和可再生能源投资行为,探讨总量碳配额与单位碳配额机制下发电商的碳谎报行为和可再生能源投资策略.通过对均衡解的分析,研究发现:①随着谎报成本系数增加,可再生能源投资量增加,而谎报水平和供应链企业利润均下降;②当上网电价上限较低时,单位碳配额机制更能促进可再生能源投资且谎报水平更低;当上限较高时,总量碳配额机制更能促进可再生能源投资且谎报水平更低;③当单位碳配额较低时,单位碳配额机制下发电商披露的碳排放量更高;当单位碳配额较高时,总量碳配额机制下发电商披露的碳排放量更高.
Under carbon allowance mechanisms,power generators have incentives to misreport their carbon emissions.Considering the practical constraint of feed-in tariff caps,this study incorporates generators'carbon misreporting and renewable energy investment deci-sions to examine the misreporting behavior and investment strategies under total allowance and unit allowance mechanisms.By analyzing the equilibrium outcomes,the study finds that:(1)as the misreporting cost coefficient increases,renewable energy investment rises,while the level of misreporting and the profits of supply chain firms both decline;(2)when the feed-in tariff cap is low,the unit allow-ance mechanism is more effective in promoting renewable energy investment and results in lower misreporting,whereas when the cap is high,the total allowance mechanism performs better in both dimensions;and(3)when the unit allowance is relatively small,generators disclose higher carbon emissions under the unit allowance mechanism,whereas when the unit allowance is relatively large,disclosed emissions are higher under the total allowance mechanism.
年,卷(期):
2026, 38(9)
机标分类号:
F274
F426.61
F832.51
在线出版日期:
2026年10月22日
基金项目:
25&ZD189:国家社会科学基金23AGL004:国家社会科学基金72572028:国家自然科学基金25YJCZH022:教育部人文社会科学研究项目2023M740532:中国博士后科学基金2024A1515110251:广东省基础与应用基础研究基金项目2023CS143:成都市哲学社会科学规划项目2026-RK00-00013-ZF:成都市软科学研究项目25JCXK09:成都理工大学双一流建设哲学社会科学学科群重点建设项目,