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演化博弈视角下分布式光伏投资意愿分析
Analysis of Investment Willingness of Distributed Photovoltaics from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory
摘要 目前,分布式光伏的发展面临着投资环境不确定、政府监管有待完善、绿色信贷支持不足等因素的巨大挑战.本文以投资者、政府和银行为主体,针对分布式光伏的投资属性,构建非合作博弈模型,为决策者提供理论依据,以提升光伏装机量.研究表明:(1)最优演化稳定策略为投资、监管、贷款,即个人有限理性下能够实现的最大化利润.(2)激励政策并不适用于所有阶段,因此政府把握进出场时机,制定科学的奖惩政策.(3)碳排放权可以形成绿色信用价值,促进绿色金融的内外联动,拓宽投资者融资渠道,注重碳交易市场的发展.
Abstract:
Currently,the development of distributed photovoltaics faces huge challenges such as uncertain investment environments,im-perfect government regulation,and insufficient green credit support.Taking investors,the government,and banks as the main subjects,this paper constructs a non-cooperative game model based on the investment attributes of distributed photovoltaics to provide a theoret-ical basis for decision-makers to increase the installed capacity of photovoltaics.The research shows that:(1)The optimal evolutionary stable strategy is investment,regulation,and loan,which is the maximum profit that can be achieved under the limited rationality of in-dividuals.(2)Incentive policies are not applicable to all stages,so the government should grasp the timing of entry and exit and formu-late scientific reward and punishment policies.(3)Carbon emission rights can form green credit value,promote the internal and external linkage of green finance,broaden the financing channels for investors,and focus on the development of the carbon trading market.
刊 名 江苏商论
年,卷(期): 2026, (10)
分类号: F407.2
机标分类号: F224.32 F832.51 F323
在线出版日期: 2026年11月4日
基金项目: :昆明理工大学创新发展研究基金重大项目CFZD202202:云南装备制造绿色发展研究,