The Transfer of Control in State-Owned Enterprises and Corporate Financialization
摘要
在实体经济脱实向虚背景下,基于我国 A 股非金融类上市公司的数据,实证检验了国有企业控制权转移对企业金融化的影响.研究发现:国有企业控制权转移到民营企业会显著提高企业金融化水平,并且民营企业持有金融资产主要源于预防性动机.机制检验表明,国有企业控制权转移通过增加融资约束的渠道进而提高了企业金融化.进一步分析发现,在小规模企业和非制造业行业,国有企业控制权转移对企业金融化的促进作用更加明显,再次证明了企业金融化的预防性动机,在委托代理问题更大的企业,国有企业控制权转移并未对企业金融化产生更明显的促进作用,进而排除了企业金融化的投机性动机.因此,企业可适度持有高流动性金融资产进行预防性储蓄,政府不应该"谈金融化色变"并需持续推动混改政策完善.
Against the backdrop of the real economy shifting toward the financial sector,this study empirically examines the impact of the transfer of control in state-owned enterprises on corporate financialization,based on data from non-financial A-share listed companies in China from 2013 to 2021.The study finds that the transfer of control from state-owned enterprises(SOEs)to private enterprises significantly increases the level of corporate financialization,and that private enterprises'holdings of financial assets are primarily driven by precautionary motives.Mechanism tests indicate that the transfer of SOEs control enhances corporate financialization by increasing financing constraints.Further analysis reveals that in small-scale enterprises and non-manufacturing sectors,the promotional effect of the transfer of control from state-owned enterprises on corporate financialization is more pronounced,further substantiating the precautionary motive behind corporate financialization.Conversely,in enterprises with more severe principal-agent problems and in regions with weaker legal systems,the transfer of control from state-owned enterprises does not have a more pronounced promotional effect on corporate financialization,thereby ruling out speculative motives for corporate financialization.Therefore,enterprises can be allowed to appropriately hold highly liquid financial assets for precautionary savings,and the government should not"react with alarm at the mere mention of financialization",but should continue to promote the refinement of mixed-ownership reform policies.